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Summary
Suppressing enemy air defenses has been a central element of projecting military
air power for over 50 years.  However, several developments suggest that this mission
is of growing importance to the Department of Defense (DOD).  Some analysts say that
the emergence of new technologies and air defenses will increasingly challenge U.S.
SEAD efforts.  Making budgetary judgements on SEAD programs and processes
requires the assessment of complex factors.  This report will be updated.
Introduction
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) is defined by the Department of
Defense (DOD) as “That activity that neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades
surface-based enemy air defenses by destructive and/or disruptive means.”1 By this
definition, many military platforms, munitions, and processes contribute to SEAD,
including reconnaissance and surveillance, stand-off jamming, employment of air-to-
surface munitions, and electronic and infrared (IR) countermeasures.2
A variety of weapons platforms and munitions can and have been used to attack
enemy air defenses, including long range bombers, helicopters, surface-to-surface
missiles, precision guided munitions (PGMs), rockets, and “dumb bombs.” However,
some combat aircraft have been designed or modified to increase their effectiveness
against enemy air defenses and are typically thought of as SEAD assets. These include the
F-16, EA-6B, F/A-18 and F-15E. These aircraft carry a number of munitions useful
against surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Some carry the AGM-88 High Speed Anti
Radiation Missile (HARM) which is designed to lock-on to and destroy the ground-based
radars used by some SAMs and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA). Also, the HARM Targeting
System (HTS) and the Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing and Evaluation
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System (TERPES), improve the ability of the F-16CJ and Marine Corps EA-6B Prowlers
to target enemy air defense radars.
Suppressing  enemy air defenses has always been an important means of protecting
U.S. aircraft, and enabling effective air operations. However, SEAD may be of growing
importance to DOD and Congress for at least three reasons. 
! While combat aircraft have played an important role in most U.S.
conflicts since World War I, the last several conflicts (Bosnia in 1995,
Kosovo in 1999, Iraq 1996-present, and Afghanistan in 2001) have
emphasized the use of military aviation, suggesting that defense planners
are finding airpower an increasingly practicable military tool. 
! There appear to be very few countries capable of seriously challenging
U.S. air forces in air-to-air combat. Since Operation Desert Storm, 100
percent of all U.S. combat aircraft losses have been due to enemy air
defenses. No U.S. aircraft has been lost to an enemy aircraft since 1991.
Most countries will challenge U.S. airpower primarily with surface-based
air defenses.3 
! DOD finds some air defenses difficult to suppress or destroy. Many
analysts say that emerging air defense technologies and tactics will prove
more threatening and more difficult to counter than current systems.
Issues of Concern
The Pentagon frequently expresses concern over several interrelated  developments
in enemy air defenses: the emergence and proliferation of a new generation of Russian
SAMs, and the application of new technologies, either in conjunction with these or with
other air defense elements. Shoulder-fired missiles continue to pose a problem for today’s
SEAD forces. Observers are also concerned about the effect of strict rules of engagement
on SEAD effectiveness.
Russian SA-10 and SA-12 SAMs have been operational since the 1980s, but
currently are in the inventory or possession of only a handful of countries (e.g., Russia,
China, Cyprus, The Czech Republic, and Germany).4 These “double digit” SAMs are a
concern for military planners due to their mobility, long range, high altitude, advanced
missile guidance, and sensitive radars. The Russian SA-20, still under development, has
been likened to the U.S. Patriot PAC-2 missile, but with an even longer range and a radar
capable of detecting stealthy aircraft.  Military planners are concerned that a country with
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only a handful of these SAMs could effectively challenge U.S. military air operations by
threatening aircraft and disrupting operations from great distances.
A variety of new technologies and military systems could exacerbate the “double
digit” SAM challenge. First, commercial information and communications technologies
are enabling adversaries to better network the elements of their air defense systems. This
allows them to disperse radars, SAM launchers and other associated platforms throughout
the battlespace, and to share targeting information between launchers. This, in turn,
suggests that radars may be used less frequently and for shorter periods of time,
complicating U.S. SEAD efforts. Second, terminal defenses are being marketed by a
number of international defense companies. These radar-guided Gatling guns are designed
to protect “double digit” SAMs or other high value air defense assets, by shooting 3,000
to 4,500 rounds per minute into the sky. These systems could prove quite effective in
shooting down HARM or other missiles aimed at enemy air defenses. Third, Russia and
other countries have developed and are selling GPS jammers. Over varying distances,
these low-watt jammers degrade or totally disrupt the GPS guidance signals used by many
U.S. PGMs to augment inertial guidance systems, reducing their accuracy.
U.S. military planners  must also grapple with today’s pernicious air defense threats,
such as shoulder-fired missiles.  Unlike “double digit” SAMs, MANPADs (eg. the U.S.
Stinger, Russian SA-7, and French Mistral) are widely proliferated, and found in the
inventories of scores of countries. These  missiles are difficult to suppress due to their
small size, high mobility and IR guidance. Unlike radar guidance, IR guidance — which
MANPADs tend to use — does not emit energy that U.S. self-defense systems can detect.
Thus, the launch of an IR-guided missile often comes as a surprise to the targeted aircraft,
reducing the time for evasive maneuvers or deployment of self protection
countermeasures. This increases MANPADs effectiveness. IR guided SAMs were  the
primary source of air combat losses in Operation Desert Storm,5 and since 1973, nearly
half of all air losses in combat have been attributed to IR-guided SAMs, many of them
launched from MANPADs. Others estimate that MANPADs caused 90% of worldwide
combat aircraft losses from 1984-2001.6 
Shoulder-fired missiles also pose a terrorist threat to civilian aircraft.  RAND
estimates that at least 20 and as many as 40 civilian airliners were shot down by terrorists
using MANPADs between 1975 and 1992.7  (CRS estimates six of these aircraft were
actually airliners, the others were smaller than most commercial aircraft.)8  The threat to
civilian airliners posed by terrorists with shoulder-fired missiles appears to be an issue of
increasing congressional concern.  At least three bills introduced during the FY2005
budget cycle addressed methods for mitigating the threat of shoulder-fired missiles to
commercial aviation.9
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Rules of engagement (ROE) are designed by military planners to reduce the
likelihood of fratricide (shooting down friendly aircraft), to minimize unintended civilian
casualties, and in some cases, for political feasibility (e.g., operating in ways palatable to
coalition partners). Some have asserted that ROE in recent conflicts have been
“draconian” and tied the hands of SEAD pilots; reducing their effectiveness.10  DOD may
seek congressional support for more lenient ROE in future wars.
Assessing Future SEAD Needs
There  are many factors that can be weighed, when attempting to measure the success
of DOD SEAD efforts, and determining what future  needs (e.g., new aircraft, upgrades
to self-protection capabilities, better munitions) may be. DOD has had considerable
experience suppressing enemy air defenses over the last 50 years. A survey of this
experience provides some insight into SEAD success and challenges, and helps provide
a context in which Congressional oversight decisions can be made. The following section
describes three “measures of effectiveness” (MOEs) that can be used to focus
Congressional inquiry into future SEAD needs.
MOE 1: Combat Attrition. The first area that merits examination is combat
attrition. How many U.S. combat aircraft have been shot down in recent conflicts? How
many have been shot down by ground-based air defenses? Because SEAD missions are
designed ultimately to protect U.S. aircraft, combat attrition provides some insight into
the effectiveness of SEAD efforts.  As indicated in Table 1 below, from World War II to
the present, the loss of U.S. combat aircraft has steadily declined, both in absolute terms,
and relative to the number of combat sorties flown. While these numbers do not prove
that  SEAD is solely responsible for this very favorable trend, it is clear that SEAD is an
important contributor to aircraft survivability.
Table 1.  Estimates of Combat Aircraft Losses
Conflict Combat Sorties Total CombatLossesa Attrition Rate
World War IIb 2,498,283 19,030 0.76%
Koreac 591,693 1,253 0.2%
Vietnamd (AF data only) 219,407 1,437 0.65%
Desert Storm (Iraq)e 68,150 33 0.04%
Bosniaf 30,000 3 0.01%
Kosovog 21,111 2 0.009%
Northern/Southern Watchh 268,000 0 0.0%
Iraqi Freedomi 20,733 1 0.004%
Notes:
 a Other losses, either due to pilot error, accident, or unknown enemy action not included.
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MOE 2: Effort Expended.  Another factor that can be considered when assessing
U.S. SEAD capabilities is the amount of effort that is expended to protect U.S. aircraft.
How onerous a mission is SEAD? As Table 2 below suggests, twenty-to-thirty percent of
all combat sorties in recent conflicts were devoted to SEAD, while historically, this ratio
is much lower. While this increase in SEAD sorties could be attributable to a number of
factors, it appears that SEAD is a growing mission area.
Table 2.  Estimates of SEAD sorties and Total Combat Sorties
Conflict Combat Sorties SEAD Sorties %
Vietnama 219,407 11,389 5.2
Desert Storm (Iraq)b 68,150 4,326 6.3
Bosniac 2,451 785 32.0
Kosovod 21,111 4,538 21.5
Northern/Southern Watche 268,000 67,000 25.0
Notes : 
a Conversation with Dr. Wayne Thompson, Center for Air Force History, Bolling AFB. August 9, 2001.
Figure includes 8,669 F-105 Wild Weasel sorties, and 2,720 “Flack Suppression sorties. Figures
include USAF sorties only. Does not include 24,278 EB-66 or 11,732 misc. EW sorties.
b Gulf War Air Power Survey. Volume V: Statistical Compendium and Chronology. Washington, DC 1993.
p. 232-233. Figures include coalition partners. Does not include 2,918 EW sorties.
c Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning. Final Report of the Air University Balkans
Air Campaign Study. Edited by Col. Robert C. Owen, USAF. Air University Press. Maxwell Air
Force Base, Alabama. January 2000. P. 334.
d Fulford, Mulhollan correspondence. Op. Cit.
e Maj. Gen. Walter Buchanan. Air Force Current Operations. Briefing to Congressional Air Power Caucus.
Bolling AFB.  March 12, 2001.
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MOE 3: Efficiency. By some measures, U.S. SEAD efforts have been effective.
However, other observations suggest that efficiency could be improved. For example, one
MOE pertains to the destruction of enemy air defenses (DEAD). While suppressing
enemy air defenses through electronic warfare (EW) or intimidation can effectively
protect U.S. aircraft, the effect is ephemeral. Destroying enemy air defenses is generally
preferred to suppressing them, because of the enduring effect that destruction has on
military capabilities. As Table 3 suggests, U.S. air forces have had mixed results in recent
conflicts destroying enemy air defenses. In some cases, such as in Iraq, U.S. destructive
SEAD efforts have been somewhat successful. In other cases, such as Kosovo — where
the Serbs employed a variety of challenging tactics — efforts were less successful.
Table 3.  Destructive SEAD: Some Estimated Results
Conflict Estimated Results
Desert Storma 35 of 120 fixed SAM batteries destroyed
Bosniab 52 of 70 air defense targets destroyed
Kosovoc 3 of 25 SA-6 batteries destroyed, 10 of 41 SAM radars destroyed
N./S. Watchd 33 of 35 air defense targets damaged, but many rebuilt and improved .
Notes:
a Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol. V. Op. Cit. p.19.
b Deliberate Force Case Study. Op. Cit. p.342. 
c Benjamin Lambeth. “Kosovo and the Continuing SEAD Challenge.” Aerospace Power Journal. Summer
2002, and interview with personnel involved in Operation Allied Force.
d Iraq Improves in Face of Bombs. New York Times on the Web. August 30, 2001.
Another measure of efficiency pertains to tactics. One  common SEAD tactic to fire
numerous HARM missiles preemptively — that is, in the direction of a SAM that is
suspected to exist, but which hasn’t turned on its radar. Thirty three of 56 HARMs used
in Operation Deliberate Force were fired preemptively.11  Over 1,000  HARMs in
Operation Allied Force were fired at only a handful of SAMs, suggesting many
preemptive shots.12 While using HARMs in this way may effectively deter adversaries
from shooting SAMs or AAA at U.S. aircraft, it also poses two problem areas. First,
preemptive HARM use can be expensive since HARMs cost  approximately $250,000 per
missile. Second, preemptively fired HARMs present a fratricide risk. If there are no
enemy radar emissions for the HARM to guide on, the missile could lock-on to friendly
emissions and destroy the wrong target. According to Lt. Gen. Michael Short, “The
preemptive HARM shot, when it opens its eyes and there is nothing for it to see, takes off
like a ‘mad dog.’ At least six HARMs (shot during Kosovo) ended up by accident in
Bulgaria.”13  While launching HARMs preemptively may be an effective and necessary
tactic, it not an efficient tactic. More importantly, reliance on this tactic may be an
indication of intelligence and targeting cycle shortfalls that may need to be addressed.
